After 10 years of land reform in Madagascar: is the process of land certification massive and inclusive? by Burnod, Perrine et al.
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1. Introduction 
From 1990 to 2000, numerous land reforms based on the sole promotion of individual and freehold 
tenure and the implementation of a land administration system providing formal tenure security did 
not reach their initial objectives and expected effects (Lavigne Delville dir., 1998; Alden Wily, 2003). 
Some reform projects even failed or were abandoned before being implemented (Colin et al., 2009; 
Ali et al., 2014).  
Large differences existed among these land reforms, not only in their legal basis (institutions, rules and 
legal registration system) but also in the way they were implemented. In most cases, legal documents 
were delivered on users’ demand and not on a systematic basis. This did not benefit to any sizable 
share of poor land owners (Deininger et al., 2008). On the contrary, it gave the better-off, better-
informed, better-socially endowed or those who were born in the village and had been living there on 
a permanent basis the opportunity to legalize their rights without informing and getting the other land 
right owners’ or users’ approval (Benjaminsen et al., 2008; Deininger and Feder, 2009; Colin et al., 
2009). Land reforms thus led to the active or passive exclusion of numerous rights holders: inter alia 
women, foreign born or cattle herders (Toulmin et al., 2004).  
Since 2000, the new paradigm of land reforms has been to accompany the gradual evolution of land 
tenure through the legal recognition of existing landholders’ rights (Bruce et al., 1994) and the 
decentralization of land management (Lavigne-Delville dir., 1998). The most advanced reforms so far 
have been the ones implemented in Ethiopia and in Rwanda based on systematic demarcation and 
land certificate delivery (Deininger et al., 2008; Ali et al., 2011). The Malagasy reform, which started in 
2005 also belongs to this new generation of land reforms in Africa. Two major innovations have inter 
alia emerged: (i) decentralized land management through the creation of local land offices at 
commune level; and (ii) land certification, which enables individuals to register private property 
provided the community agrees on the legitimacy of the claimed rights.  
The Malagasy land reform objectives are to overcome the pitfalls of the former land titling system that 
has mainly benefited to economic and political elites (Jacoby and Minten, 2006) and to provide tenure 
security to a majority of households thanks to a low cost, easy and participatory registration process 
(Teyssier et al., 1998). However, contrary to similar land reforms in other African countries such as 
Ethiopia or Rwanda (Deininger et al., 2008; Ali et al., 2016), land certification is “on demand” and not 
based on a systematic demarcation process. Then, a crucial stake in terms of development is to assess 
whether the Malagasy certification is really massive and inclusive or the preserve of the elites. To 
explore this issue, this paper analyzes the evolution and the determinants of farmers’ demand for land 
certificates over the 2008-2016 period. In addition to testing the impact of various household and plot 
characteristics that are likely to influence the propensity to certificate one’s land, it assesses the impact 
of information and promotional campaigns through their effects on prices. 
From a methodological standpoint, this paper uses three sources of data: (i) qualitative and in-depth 
interviews at the local level, (ii) monthly data on land certificate demand for all communes equipped 
with a local land office (LLO); and (iii) first-hand panel data that were collected through an ad hoc 
survey that has been conducted in 2011 and 2015 among 1,860 farm households in four regions and 
nine communes of Madagascar. In order to investigate the determinants of land certification at the 
plot level and to assess in particular the role of price in this process, it uses a survival analysis. It does 
so because the data reveal strong variations in the time taken by farmers to certify their land (from a 
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few months to several years) suggesting that land certification follows a dynamic process which is 
influenced by the timing of information diffusion, but also perhaps by risk aversion, or the presence of 
peer effects.  
Since the beginning of the land reform, more than 200,000 land certificates have been delivered across 
the country. This is substantial and much more important than the number of land titles that has been 
delivered since the independence of the Malagasy State 60 years ago – and also much more important 
than similar “on demand” registration programs in other African countries. Even so, the demand for 
land certificate is not massive compared to the number of family farms (about 2.5 million) and 
agricultural plots (estimated at around 6 million). In addition, the demand is declining every year at 
the national level. But the demand is also very contrasted according to the communes and irregular 
and interspersed by picks at local level, echoing promotional and informational campaigns (which 
translate into lower prices and better information in the targeted villages). Our results underline that 
these campaigns had a positive effect on the level and the distribution of demand. Far from being the 
preserve of the elite, certification actually seems relatively accessible to a large panel of households 
that are heterogeneous in terms of their wealth, level of education and origin– although better-off and 
better-educated households do tend to use more local handwritten documents (petits papiers) and 
legal processes to secure their land rights (more certificates and titles). Quite unexpectedly, both the 
descriptive statistics and the estimation results from the duration model underline that poor 
households and women were more likely to apply for a land certificate during the second period of the 
reform when the global demand was decreasing and the promotional campaigns were over. This 
confirms on quantitative grounds that, in addition to a classical/common behavior regarding the 
adoption of an institutional innovation, there are two main reasons why people apply for certificates 
(Burnod et al., 2014). Firstly, landowners apply for certificates as an opportunistic response to 
information and promotional campaigns in villages (72% of certificates in areas covered by the PECF 
survey were delivered during these campaigns) and this was a more systematic strategy among better-
off households. Secondly and later in the period, landowners submit an application for certification 
due to their proactive desire to reaffirm their ownership rights, and those who do it later are mostly 
poor households and women in order to fend off concrete threats. Either way, certificates make their 
holders feel that they have greater security of tenure, for them and notably for the future generations.  
In terms of land policy recommendations, this suggests that renewing promotional campaigns for land 
certification can be useful to increase and enlarge again the level and distribution of demand. This may 
moreover compensate for the low demand currently observed.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the land tenure reform and its 
enforcement. It discusses, based on land observatory data at the national level, how both the context 
and the implementation modalities (in terms of financial and technical support provided to each LLO, 
for e.g., or in terms of promotional campaigns, etc.) have had an impact on the relative success or 
failure of LLOs. Section 3 presents the ad hoc survey that we conducted in order to assess the impact 
of the reform and some descriptive statistics of the data. Section 4 analyses the level and distribution 
of land certificate demand, as well as its evolution over time at the commune level. It then compares 
the characteristics of certificate applicants and non-applicants, of early and late certificate applicants, 
and of beneficiaries from the promotional campaigns and non-beneficiaries. It also contrasts the 
characteristics of plots that have been certified with the characteristics of plots that have not. Section 
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5 presents and discusses the estimation results from duration models. Section 6 finally concludes with 
some policy recommendations. 
2. The Malagasy land reform  
2.1. Objectives and implementation 
The Malagasy land reform which has been ongoing since 2005 was a pioneer in the new generation of 
land reforms. It was aimed at giving legal standing to local land rights and at decentralizing land 
management (Teyssier et al., 2009). Indeed, the 2005 land law stipulates that untitled but occupied 
land is no longer the property of the state but the property of the occupants. The new land policy also 
breaks the legal, political and institutional monopoly previously held by the land administration. This 
represents a major step forward in terms of decentralization, giving local governments’ (Communes in 
French) new competences to register land rights in local land offices (LLOs) (Teyssier et al., 2009). The 
Communes, through a local land registry office equipped with appropriate maps (guichet foncier), can 
legalize private property rights and issue individual or collective land certificates (certificat foncier). 
Land certificate, as land title, entitles the owner to all transactions including sale, inheritance, long-
term lease, and mortgage. Certification, based on local, public and contestable procedures, is not 
systematic but engaged on landowners’ demand. It can only recognize existing rights and not attribute 
new ones.  
The first LLOs were inaugurated in 2006.1 In 2017, about 10 years later, a total of 510 LLOs has been 
set up – which means that one commune out of 3 is equipped with a LLO at the country level.. While a 
few of them emerged autonomously, the vast majority (97%) was set up only when funding became 
available (with costs ranging from €12,000 to €30,000 per office). However, once set up, most LLOs 
started operating autonomously when international funding was withdrawn two years into the 
initiative due to the political crisis [2009-2014]. Despite the crisis and thanks to the funding provided 
by the international aid, the number of LLOs increased steadily and today, they stand as a proof that 
the process has gone well beyond the pilot stage (Figure 1). Since their creation, some have fared 
better than others: 75% have proved resilient2 (even though half of them encountered problems)3 
while the 25% remaining ones have ceased operating (DR GFD and OF, 2016 data). Officials in charge 
of implementing the reform often blame LLOs’ operational problems on delayed technical support and 
lack of training. However, their fortunes are also shaped by the availability of funding and the 
commune’s financial health: it costs around $US2,500 to $US3,500 (about 15% to 20% of the communal 
budget) a year to run a land office (Andrianirina et al, 2013). Communes have not been allocated the 
resources they need to exercise their new competences, and users have to bear a much greater 
                                                          
1 To investigate global trends in the creation of local land offices and the demand for land certificates, we use 
the data collected on a regular basis by the Malagasy Land Observatory (MLO) at the national level. Since the 
beginning of the land reform indeed, one of MLO’s tasks has been to monitor key indicators such as the number 
and localization of local land offices, the number of land certificates requested and issued, etc. 
(www.observatoire-foncier.mg). 
2 These offices have survived thanks to bridged funding (from thematic donor projects), self-funding (from local 
taxation), by raising the price of the certificates, and by reducing their activities (cutting staff from two to one, 
paying them part-time wages, reducing their opening hours and authorising agents to carry out various tasks in 
the town hall – taxation, secretariat, etc.). 
3 Opening on an ad hoc basis, lacking an operating budget, dealing with files in dribs and drabs, experiencing 
virtually no demand for new certificates. 
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proportion of the costs of certification than is the case with land title registration (Andrianirina-
Ratsialonana, 2009). The successes and problems in LLOs are thus largely determined by the municipal 
team’s level of motivation and information/promotional campaigns, which seem to be both the cause 
and effect of the lack /success of social demand for legal formalisation. 
Figure 1 : Annual evolution of LLOs’ creation 
 
Source: Malagasy Land Observatory (?) 
 
2.2. Level and distribution of land certificate demand at the national level 
Based on the premise that land certificates were cheap and that the whole procedure to get them was 
fast and easy, both the promoters and financial backers of the reform expected the demand for 
certification to be high.4 The take-up rates of the early years of 2008 and 2009 during which many LLOs 
were created proved them right but the longer-term trend has been much more sluggish, with a grand 
total of around 216,000 requests for certification and 116,000 certificates delivered by the end of 2016 
(Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.). Nonetheless, this number is much higher than the number of 
land titles delivered over the same period5 – and also compared to the results of “on demand” 
registration programs in other countries (see Niger: Diarra et Monimart, 2006; Ivory Coast: Kouame, 
2015; Malawi: Holden et al., 2006; Peters and Kambewa, 2007). Even so, the demand for land 
certificates is not massive compared to the number of family farms (about 3 million) and agricultural 
plots (estimated at more than 6 million6). In addition, the demand has been declining every year at the 
national level: while the number of applications increased by 6100% between 2007 and 2009 (from 
2.061 to 126.539 applications), it almost stabilized from 2014 onwards.  
                                                          
4 Certificates cost 50 times less than titles ($US15 in rural context and $US30 in urban context compared with 
$US500-700) and can be obtained ten times more quickly (in 6 to 18 months rather than 6 to 10 years).  
5 Over the same period, the State land services delivered by the means of registration an average of 1,500 land 
titles per year (www.observatoire-foncier.mg). 
6 The last agricultural census was in 2004-2005 and estimated the number of farms at 2.5 million. Today, this 
number is likely to be higher than 3 million (Sourisseau et al., 2015). Based on the assumption that each farm 
owns between 2 and 3 plots on average, the total number of plots could range between 6 and 9 million. 
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Figure 2 : Annual evolution of land certificate demand  
 
Source: Malagasy Land Observatory (?) 
 
However, there are marked differences between communes and when disaggregated at the locality 
level, general trends are found to be much more irregular, with sudden and transitory picks resulting 
from promotional and informational campaigns. These campaigns were orchestrated to boost the 
demand for land certification and consisted in sending LLO agents into the villages to promote the 
reform and emphasize the opportunity to get land certificates at much reduced prices (depending on 
the commune, prices ranged between $US1 and $USD6 during the campaigns against an average of 
$US15 in normal times). Most of the promotional campaigns occurred before 2011, when donors were 
able to subsidize them through development projects  
As is clear from the data collected by the Malagasy Land Observatory, these campaigns have played a 
major role by providing both information on the land reform and incentives to farmers. But the 
contrasted patterns in certification rates observed both inter- and intra-regionally call for a more in-
depth analysis of the determinants of land certification to which we now turn. 
3. The data 
3.1. The PEFC survey 
To identify the determinants of land certification at the household and plot levels, we use first-hand 
data that were collected through two waves of an ad hoc survey, the PECF (“Perception et Effets de la 
Certification Foncière”) survey, conducted in October 2011 and in November 2015 on a large sample 
of 1,862 rural households residing in four regions and nine communes of Madagascar (see Figure 3). 
Both waves of the survey focuses on the perception and the effects of the land reform at the household 
level.  
• Regions and communes were first selected in a reasoned way in order to reflect the diversity of 
land tenure practices as well as the strong heterogeneity in certification rates between regions 
and communes (Table 1). Results described here on the first effects of the Malagasy land reform 
are representative of the 9 studied communes but not of the country as a whole; 
• Within each chosen commune, the survey was based on open interviews, preliminary focus groups 
with various inhabitants and local representatives and on questionnaires with households (either 
the household head or his/her spouse);  
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• In 2011, within each commune, households were randomly selected, in such a way to ensure that 
at least one third of the sample households has certificates (or about to have one). The 2011 
database is thus composed of 1,862 households among which 37% have at least one land 
certificate, and 7,697 plots of land among which 20% are certified or about to be; 
• In 2015, 85% of the households were interviewed again (and the 15% missing ones were replaced). 
The 2015 sample is thus composed of 1,834 households (1,541 in the panel) and 7,868 plots. 
Results are weighted7 in order to be representative at the commune level, using country-
representative survey data taken from the National Agriculture Census (MinAgri, 2004) and the 
Land Observatory data, and an attrition coefficient has been calculated to adapt the 2011 weight 
to the 2015 re-contact rate; The questionnaire was designed so as to include various modules on 
land tenure practices, perception on tenure insecurity, modes of land rights validation (including 
documentation), conflicts, investment, and land transactions for all households’ plots. It strongly 
benefited from previous in-depth qualitative interviews conducted either by the authors, the Land 
Observatory team, master and PhD students (Boué, 2013) and other researchers (Jacoby and 
Minten, 2006). A few new questions were added to the 2015 questionnaire. Also, all our results 
will be interpreted in light of the insights derived from qualitative interviews and analyses.  
 
                                                          
7 Weighting is based on the ratio “number of household engaged in certification/ number of households”.  
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Figure 3: Localization of studied communes 
 
Source: Malagasy Land Observatory (2012) 
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Table 1: Local land offices (LLO) and communes characteristics in mid-2011 and 2015 
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Region 
Commune 
Analamanga             
  Tsaramasoandro nov-09 2 13,410 1,916 179 120 0.09 (-) 222 118 538 286 
Vakinankaratra             
  Ambatomena sept-08 3 25,694 3,670 648 557 0.18 (-) 53 107 127 305 
  Ambohimiarivo août-08 3 12,435 1,553 689 289 0.33 (+/-) 163 153 652 446 
  Manandona août-08 3 14,599 2,086 1870 1,494 0.90 (+) 87 550 2,237 2,013 
Diana             
  Antsakoamanondro nov-08 3 11,174 1,862 249 80 0.13 (+/-) 340 73 721 177 
  Benavony nov-08 3 3,062 502 253 102 0.50 (+) 1 6 280 174 
Menabe             
  Ampanihy juil-08 3 15,931 2,923 654 567 0.22 (+/-) 95 107 893 858 
  Malaimbandy nov-09 2 109,432 21,886 724 500 0.03 (-) 631 793 2,428 1,436 
  Analaiva juil-08 3 22,348 4,368 987 752 0.23 (+/-) 73 16 1,089 919 
Source: Malagasy Land Observatory.  
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3.2 Descriptive statistics 
3.2.1 The demand for certificates and the role of promotional campaigns 
As emphasized in the previous section, promotional campaigns significantly contributed to boost the 
demand for certification. This is sharply illustrated by the nine communes covered by the PECF survey. 
Table 2 first shows that among the 1,824 households covered by the second wave of the survey in 
2015, 18% had requested a land certificate at least once: 10.9% had done so in the context of a 
promotional campaign and 7.1% outside this context. Most promotional campaigns took place before 
2011; they were orchestrated by LLOs and funded by external donors. Depending on the motivation 
of LLO agents and available funding, some communes were more concerned than others. In the nine 
communes included on our survey, for e.g., promotional campaigns have been much more intense and 
long in Antsakoamanondro and Anailava than in the three communes of Vakinankaratra 
(Ambatomena, Manandona and Ambohimiarivo) and in Tsaramasoandro in which no campaign has 
ever taken place. (Table 3). As is clear from the table, the number of requests for land certificates 
recorded at the LLO level shows that much more requests have been made during campaign years than 
in non-campaign ones. 
Table 2 : Distribution of households applying for land certificate in/outside promotional campaigns  
Households who applied for 
land certificate during 
promotional campaign 
Households who applied for 
land certificate outside 
campaign 
Households who did not 
apply 
 
10.9% 7.1% 82% 100% 
Source: PECF, round 2, 2015 (n=1,824 households). 
Table 3 : Dates of promotional campaigns and total number of requests for land certificates in each surveyed 
commune 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Antsakoamanondro           
Number of applications x 125 21 235 322 18     
Campaigns?  Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Benavony         
Number of applications 69 120 57 33 1 0 0 0 
Campaigns?  Yes Yes       
Analaiva         
Number of applications 352 379 123 162 34 9 18 12 
Campaigns?  Yes Yes Yes Yes     
Ampanihy         
Number of applications 507 258 24 9 25 16 33 21 
Campaigns?  Yes Yes       
Malaimbandy         
Number of applications // 3 1,064 730 223 73 313 22 
Campaigns?  //  Yes Yes   Yes  
Ambatomena         
Number of applications 6 30 0 38 4 2 47 0 
Campaigns? Yes Yes       
Manandona         
Number of applications 880 957 256 57 13 17 57 0 
Campaigns? Yes Yes Yes      
Ambohimiarivo         
Number of applications 217 272 0 0 54 31 68 10 
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Campaigns? Yes Yes       
Tsaramasoandro         
Number of applications // 15 150 151 22 76 124 0 
Campaigns? //        
Source: Malagasy Land Observatory.  
The impact of promotional campaigns appears even clearer in Figure A1 in Appendix, which shows the 
number of requests for land certificates every 4 months at the commune level. Each pick is concomitant 
to a promotional campaign. 
Part of the success of the campaigns in boosting demand is due to the substantial price discounts that 
were associated to them (Table 4). Depending on the commune, prices ranged between $US1 and 
$USD6 during campaign years against an average of $USxxx in non-campaign ones. In the econometric 
analyses that follow, in which we model the time to request a land certificate, the impact of the 
campaigns will thus be assessed through their effect on prices. 
Table 4 : Median costs of land certificate per commune in campaign and non-campaign years (in 1,000 of MGA) 
 Median cost for delivered certificates 
 Discounted prices    Normal prices  
Analamanga      
  Tsaramasoandro n.r.    41 
Vakinankaratra      
  Ambatomena 3    25 
  Ambohimiarivo 3    10 
  Manandona 3    6 
Diana      
 Antsakoamanondro 15    15 
  Benavony 15    20 
Menabe      
  Ampanihy 5    20 
  Malaimbandy 5    20 
  Analaiva 10    50 
Total 6    20 
Notes: In 2011, calculations are based on 1,182 plots which were certified over the2008-2011 period, XXX plots 
for the 2011-2015 period.  
 
3.2.2 Demand distribution  
Sample household and plot characteristics 
Land assets. In Madagascar, the vast majority of farms are small and under 1 hectare (ha). In the nine 
studied communes, a minority is landless (4%). Indeed, 48% own between 2 and 3 plots and 38% have 
4 or more plots (71% of the plots are smaller than 0.5 ha). Households farm themselves the majority 
of the plots (88% of the plots8). Next to housing, plots are mainly dedicated to rice production - the 
main production and food for all rural households (42% of the sample plots, 60% of the cultivated 
                                                          
8 Temporary land transfers (sharecropping, leasing and also loan being part of mutual aid system) are notably 
frequent on rice plots (see Jacoby and Minten, 2006; Bellemare, 2011; Zombre, 2014).  
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sample plots)9.  
Land access. Households mostly access to land through inheritance (54.4% of the plots were inherited 
and 3.1% donated). They also strongly rely on land market (Jacoby and Minten, 2006; Sandron et al., 
2008; Bellemare, 2011). In the PECF communes, 31.8% of the parcels were acquired through 
purchase10. The low percentage of appropriated/cleared plots (10.7%) as compared to the high 
percentage of purchased ones indicates that most of the land in the studied areas is already 
appropriated and reveals a process of space saturation. Men, women, couples or even families as a 
whole can own the land, but men, in line with inheritance, local and customary rules, are the main 
owners (46.9% of the plots are owned by men, 42% by couples, 10.6% by women and 0.4% by families).  
Modes of land rights validation. Needless to say, land laws do not operate in a vacuum but, to rephrase 
Griffiths (1992), “in a social field that is governed by laws, rules and conventions of different origins 
and that generates its own rules of the game”. Next to the legal authorities delivering land certificates 
and land titles, different local state or non-state authorities operate at the local level to legitimize and 
even formalize through written documents, different bundles of land rights or land transactions: 
descendants of royal families, elders, village chiefs, mayors, etc. (see e.g. Rakoto, 1995; Ottino, 1998; 
Leroy et al., 2006; Aubert et al., 2008; Omrane, 2008; Muttenzerg, 2010; Boue, 2013). In this context 
of institutional and normative pluralism, securing property rights requires a combination of rights 
validation at both local and state levels. In practice, Malagasy households combine various ways to 
secure land. The first one is through social recognition. The second one includes legal documents: 
either certificates or titles. The third one results from the local recording systems, the so-called “petits 
papiers” (Jacoby and Minten, 2006; Boue, 2013), used to secure transfers and validate rights in 
response to or imitation of administrative practices (cf. Lavigne Delville, 2003). These papers, which 
are handwritten documents, either stamped or not by local authorities, offer a first formalization of 
rights or more exactly, an “informal formalization of rights” (Mathieu, 2001)11. To give the general 
picture, 31% of the samplehouseholds have no document at all on all their plots (Table 5). The large 
majority (50.4 %) has at least one written document on one of its plots (i.e. has at least one petit papier 
or tax receipt). The legalization of rights only concerns a minority: 21.3% have at least one legal 
document on one of their plots: respectively 18.7% have applied to or possess at least one land 
certificate and 2.4% have one land title12. Of course, households can have documents on several of 
their plots.  
                                                          
9 Pastures, as they are most of the time collectively managed, were not systematically declared. We do not take 
them in account in the following analysis even if they are crucial for herders.  
10 In 2001, at the national level, 16% of the land was acquired through this way (Minten and Razafaindraibe, 
2003). As the process is cumulative, it is coherent to observe ten years later a higher rate of purchased plots.  
11 “Formalization” means here the use of any type of land documents, “informal formalization” means the use of 
written documents, “legalization” being restricting to the delivery of legal written documents, i.e. titles or 
certificates. The petits papiers are handwritten documents accompanying transactions (sales, inheritances and 
donations). They can also attest property, notably, on the basis of the improvement principle (principe de mise 
en valeur). They are signed by both parties to the transaction and/or possibly other witnesses (family members 
or others). Some are signed and/or stamped by a representative of local state authorities (head of village, mayor, 
etc.). In addition to this rich diversity of land documents, sometimes people also consider land tax receipts as a 
proof of ownership. Strictly speaking, Petits papiers and tax receipts have not legal validity but they can act as a 
first proof of property in case of conflicts (Rochegude, 2001; Aubert et al., 2006).  
12 There are strong inter commune variations, ranging from 3 to 30% for certificates and from 0.1% to 4.4% for 
titles. 
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Table 5: Household distribution (in %): nb. of owned plots, documentation  
Number of plots per household Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
0 4.0 4.0 
1 9.1 13.1 
2 16.9 30.0 
3 21.6 51.6 
4 13.2 64.8 
5 9.5 74.3 
6 to 9 19.0 93.3 
10 and more 6.6 100.0 
Total (on 1834 households) 100.0  
Max level of documentation per household *   
No documentation 31.2  
“Petits papiers” or/and tax receipt  50.4  
Land certificate 18.7  
Title  2.4  
Total (out of 1,760 households) 100.0  
* The more complex and costly level of formalization at the farm level is selected 
(complex in terms of administrative procedure) 
 
Table 6 : Plots distribution (in %): modes of right validation 
Documentation  
None 43.5 
Simple “petit papier’ 22.8 
Stamped “petit papier” 10.1 
Tax receipt 13.7 
Land certificate 8.9 
Title 1.1 
Total 100.0 
Observations 7,868 plots 
*Only the mode stated as “principal” by the interviewee is considered here. 
Table 7 : Plots distribution (in %): area, land use, access, identity 
Variables Percent 
Plot area  
Less than 0.5 ha 71.4 
0.5 to 1 ha 16.8 
1 to 1.5 ha 3.8 
1.5 to 2 ha 3.0 
2 to 5 ha 4.3 
More than 5 ha 0.7 
Total 100.0 
Land use  
Housing 22.2 
Mixed (housing and crops) 2.4 
Rice 42.1 
Annual crops other than rice 27.8 
Perennial crop 2.0 
Others (pastures, fallow, etc.)  3.4 
Total 100.0 
Land access  
Sale market 31.8 
Inheritance 54.4 
Donation  3.1 
Development – cleared plot (solam-pangady) 10.7 
Total  100.0 
Landowner Identity   
Mister 46.9 
Miss 10.6 
Couple  42.0 
Family 0.4 
Others 0.1 
Total  100.0 
              Observations 7,868 plots 
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Household characteristics of land certificate applicants  
• Contrasting early- and late-applicants  
 
In order to investigate whether all households tend to be included in the process of land certification 
or not, the next paragraphs and tables not only expose differences between households who have 
requested a land certificate and those who have not but also, thanks to the 2011 and 2015 data sets, 
the differences between early- and late applicants (Table 8).  
Certification actually seems relatively accessible to a large panel of households whatever their relative 
wealth, level of education, age, origin and gender. Poor landowners and uneducated ones are indeed 
found in the pool of applicants, even though individuals who are richer (or, say, less poor13), more 
educated or older applied earlier. Regarding gender issue, female household heads requested a land 
certificate in greater proportion than male household heads in the early years after the reform and 
even more so later on. By contrast, no significant difference is found in the proportion of applicants 
between natives and migrants (about 22% for each category). Nonetheless, migrants whose ethnic 
group is in the minority in the commune of residence (often state agents or traders belonging to the 
elites) were over-represented among early-applicants while migrants sharing the same ethnic group 
as the natives (rural people that migrated and settled for wedding or agriculture purposes), were over-
represented among late-applicants. The same holds true for individuals who belong to the 
intermediary and lowest wealth categories, as well as for those who never attended school or are led 
by young head (30 to 40 years). These results are interesting on equity grounds, because they suggest 
that in the long-term, the certification process has been quite inclusive. At first sight, they are also not 
fully in line with what could be expected. Indeed, most of the promotional campaigns were organized 
right after the start of the reform, in years 2008 and 2009. Because they consisted in substantial price 
reductions (by up to 90% in some communes) and large information diffusion, they were expected to 
result in higher take-up rates than in normal times, especially among vulnerable households. For this 
specific group, it is actually the opposite that happened, since they are found to be over-represented 
among late-applicants. This suggests that price is far from being the only factor influencing demand. 
 
Table 8 : Distribution of households depending on whether and when they certified their land, by main 
characteristics (in %) 
 Percentages in column Percentages in line 
  
First 
wave 
Second 
wave 
Did not 
certify Total 
First 
wave 
Second 
wave 
Did not 
certify Total 
Poverty status         
Poorest  18.3 32.1 40.0 37.0 4.6 10.5 84.9 100.0 
Intermediary  31.1 32.7 34.6 34.0 8.5 11.6 79.9 100.0 
Richest/ Less poor 50.6 35.2 25.5 29.0 16.3 14.7 69.0 100.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0     
Education          
No school  14.7 26.5 24.8 24.1 5.7 13.3 81 100.0 
Primary school 50.4 39.9 52.7 50.9 9.24 9.47 81.28 100.0 
                                                          
13 In this paper, poverty (or wealth) is measured by a score computed using a Principal Component Analysis and 
including various household asset Indicators (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001)). Terciles were computed at the 
commune level, so that the lowest tercile of commune A may not be comparable to the lowest tercile of 
commune B.  
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Secondary school  20.9 18.0 14.7 15.7 12.5 13.86 73.64 100.0 
Tertiary school  14.0 15.6 7.8 9.4 14.03 20.16 65.81 100.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 9.35 12.08 78.57 100.0 
Age of head          
20-30 2.9 1.1 8.2 6.8 4.0 1.9 94.2 100.0 
30-40 14.1 33.8 21.0 21.8 6.1 18.7 75.2 100.0 
40-50 24.1 16.4 20.6 20.4 11.1 9.7 79.3 100.0 
50-60 31.6 25.9 25.1 25.8 11.4 12.2 76.4 100.0 
60 and + 27.3 22.8 25.3 25.2 10.1 11.0 78.9 100.0 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0     
Migration status         
Migrant minority 20.6 10.6 15.4 15.3 12.6 8.4 79.0 100.0 
Migrant majority 8.4 26.5 18.0 18.1 4.3 17.7 78.0 100.0 
Native 70.9 62.9 66.7 66.6 10.0 11.4 78.6 100.0 
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0     
Sex of head         
Female 12.9 22.5 8.5 10.6 11.3 25.5 63.2 100.0 
Male  87.2 77.6 91.5 89.4 9.1 10.5 80.4 100.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0     
Source: PECF survey, Rounds 1 and 2. 
 
• Participants and non-participants in promotional campaigns  
 
To confirm the difference between early- and late-applicants, the 2015 dataset gives us the 
opportunity to better study the difference between those households who applied for a land certificate 
during a promotional campaign – mainly implemented during the first period – and those who applied 
out of these campaigns (Table 9).  
Promotional campaigns gave incentives to a large panel of households in terms of wealth, level of 
education, age, origin and gender. Indeed, 60% of those who applied did it during these campaigns. 
However, it also sharply appears that richer (or less poor), more educated and older individuals were 
relatively more reactive to seize the promotional opportunity. Interestingly enough, female household 
heads were very reactive to apply for both during and outside promotional campaigns. These statistics 
underline that poorer, less educated and younger households have been more reluctant to try this 
institutional innovation during the first years of the land reform, probably because they are generally 
found to be more risk-averse.  
 
Table 9 : Distribution of households who certified/did not certify during/outside promotional campaigns, by main 
characteristics (in %) 
 Percentages in column Percentages in line 
 Certified 
Did not 
certify 
Total 
Certified Did not 
certify Total  
 
with 
promo. 
w/o 
promo. 
with 
promo. 
w/o 
promo. 
Poverty status         
Poorest 
21.2 24.8 42.7 39.1 
5.9 4.6 89.5 
100.
0 
Intermediary 
31.8 37.2 33.9 33.9 
10.2 7.9 81.9 
100.
0 
Richest/ Less 
poor 47.0 38.0 23.4 27.0 
18.9 10.1 71.0 
100.
0 
Total 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
100.
0 
    
Education         
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No school 
15.9 22.6 24.0 23.0 
7.5 7.1 85.4 
100.
0 
Primary school 
42.0 46.4 50.2 49.1 
9.3 6.8 83.9 
100.
0 
Secondary school 
26.4 11.7 18.4 18.8 
15.3 4.5 80.3 
100.
0 
Tertiary school 
15.7 19.3 7.4 9.1 
20.9 10.2 69.0 
100.
0 
Total 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
100.
0 
    
Age of HH head         
20-30 
0.9 0.4 7.8 6.5 
1.6 0.5 98.0 
100.
0 
30-40 
23.3 12.9 24.5 23.5 
10.8 4.0 85.3 
100.
0 
40-50 
29.6 22.8 23.0 23.7 
13.6 6.9 79.5 
100.
0 
50-60 
19.3 36.2 22.4 23.1 
9.1 11.3 79.6 
100.
0 
60 and + 
26.9 27.6 22.4 23.3 
12.6 8.5 78.9 
100.
0 
Total 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
100.
0 
    
Migration status         
Migrant minority 
10.1 11.5 7.4 8.0 
13.7 10.3 76.0 
100.
0 
Migrant majority 
23.1 26.4 22.2 22.6 
11.1 8.4 80.5 
100.
0 
Native 
66.8 62.1 70.4 69.4 
10.5 6.4 83.1 
100.
0 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
100.
0 
    
Sex of HH head         
Female 
19.1 18.5 10.5 12.0 
17.3 11.1 71.6 
100.
0 
Male 
80.9 81.5 89.5 88.0 
10.0 6.7 83.3 
100.
0 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 
100.
0 
    
Source: PECF survey, Rounds 1 and 2. 
 
3.2.3. Characteristics of certified and non-certified plots  
In the same vein, the 2015 dataset allows a comparison of plots depending on whether and how 
security rights have been validated (Table 10). In terms of plot area, plots of smaller size are slightly 
over-represented among plots with a tax receipt, while plots of larger size are clearly over-represented 
among certified plots. No clear pattern in terms of plot area appears for plots without any 
documentation. With regards land use, rice plots, which are generally the most valuable plots in terms 
of crop production and food security, and perennial crop or woody plots, which are often remote plots 
without clear demarcation, are over-represented among certified plots. Contrasted patterns in terms 
of rights’ validation are found on acquired and inherited plots. While rights on the former are found to 
be attested by various types of documents (either petits papiers or certificates), there is no written 
proof of rights on the latter, excepted tax receipts for some of them. This may be due to the complexity 
of rights distribution. But people who inherited part of their land may also be reluctant to formalize 
their rights because they fear that it could raise conflictual issues. From this point of view, a tax receipt 
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is a good compromise because it is a way to secure rights without necessitating any clarification on 
who is the owner. With regards tenure, plots that are leased-out are found to be over-represented 
among certified plots. This is quite intuitive, as certification rules out the possibility for the tenant to 
claim the land. In addition, leased-out plots are generally rice plots that have been acquired through 
the market, two characteristics that have been found to be correlated with certification–see supra. 
Last, females are found to own less plots than males, but in the meantime, they are found to be more 
prone to secure their land rights through certification. Female landowners did indeed request a 
certificate in greater proportion than male landowners, in both periods but especially more so during 
the second one (Table 11).  
 
Table 10: distribution of owned plots (in %) per modes of right validation and area, land use, land access, land 
tenure and landowner identity 
 No 
documen- 
tation 
Simple 
Petit 
papier  
Stamped 
Petit papier  
Tax 
receipt 
Certi-
ficate 
Title Total 
Plot area        
Less than 0.5 ha 44.6 22.8 9.5 14.4 7.8 0.9 100.0 
0.5 to 1 ha 40.1 23.0 13.2 12.4 10.2 1.1 100.0 
1 to 1.5 ha 33.4 25.5 16.8 13.9 9.7 0.7 100.0 
1.5 to 2 ha 35.2 26.2 6.4 11.6 19.6 1.1 100.0 
2 to 5 ha 56.0 17.0 5.2 9.6 10.2 2.0 100.0 
More than 5 ha 24.8 20.3 5.4 2.8 36.9 9.9 100.0 
Land use       
Housing 51.8 21.3 9.2 10.0 6.9 0.8 100.0 
Mixed 33.8 10.6 9.7 30.5 11.5 3.9 100.0 
Rice 36.2 25.8 10.5 13.9 12.7 1.0 100.0 
Annual crops other 
than rice 
51.1 19.0 9.1 14.8 5.1 0.9 100.0 
Perennial crop 26.8 19.4 20.1 22.4 9.2 2.1 100.0 
Pastures 6.7 63.0 23.5  3.6 3.1 100.0 
Fallow land  45.9 43.2 2.1 3.3 3.5 2.0 100.0 
Wood plot 38.7 24.5 10.3 15.5 8.8 2.2 100.0 
Other 14.3 11.6 61.4 7.5 3.1 2.0 100.0 
Land access       
Sale market 9.2 54.6 17.0 7.1 11.3 0.7 100.0 
Inheritance 57.9 7.5 7.4 17.7 8.2 1.3 100.0 
Donation  60.4 8.3 13.0 11.2 6.9 0.1 100.0 
Development  67.4 9.8 2.4 13.3 6.1 1.1 100.0 
Land tenure       
Cultivate 43.7 22.7 10.1 13.9 8.6 1.0 100.0 
Indirect 37.4 23.9 10.1 9.1 17.0 2.5 100.0 
Landowner Identity        
Mister 52.3 19.7 6.1 13.2 7.6 1.1 100.0 
Miss 41.7 18.7 11.7 12.4 14.8 0.8 100.0 
Couple  33.9 27.5 14.1 14.3 9.0 1.1 100.0 
Family 44.8 0.0 12.8 33.0 7.0 2.4 100.0 
Others 86.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.7 0.0 100.0 
        
Total  43.5 22.8 10.1 13.7 8.9 1.1 100.0 
Source : PECF survey (n=7,868 plots). 
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Table 11 : Distribution of plots depending on whether and when they were certified, by owner identity 
Owner 
  
Certified during 
first wave  
Certified during  
second wave 
Not 
certified All 
Mister  2.2 5.8 92.0 100.0 
Miss  4.6 13.0 82.4 100.0 
Couple  6.7 3.1 90.2 100.0 
Family   0.5 6.6 93.0 100.0 
Source : PECF survey (n=7,868 plots). 
 
4. Econometric analyses  
In this section, we estimate the determinants of certification through duration models in which we 
analyze the time elapsed between the establishment of a LLO in a commune and the request for a land 
certificate at the plot-level, given commune, household and plot characteristics. Our main objective is 
to investigate whether all households tend to be included in the process of land certification or not, 
and to identify the reasons for non-certification (from budget constraint to incomplete range of rights) 
and of early vs. late certification, together with the impact of promotional campaigns and of 
differentiated price in the process. 
4.1. Choice of duration models 
In the case of Madagascar’s land reform, looking at the time to request for a land certificate instead of 
simply looking at certification as a binary choice (i.e. whether to certify or not) appears particularly 
relevant for at least two reasons. First, since under this reform, certification is “on demand”, learning 
more about how much time is needed for information to circulate, and for different types of farmers 
to making up their mind and deciding whether to ask for a certificate or not, is valuable. It informs us 
about the potential outreach of the reform among different groups of farmers, and gives us 
information on those that may request for a land certificate in the future. The literature on the 
diffusion of innovations indeed shows that time matters (see Rodgers, 2001 ; Foster and Rosenzweig, 
1995), and in particular that early- adopters differ from late ones in that they have access more rapidly 
to information, are more risk takers, while late adopters need more time to get information, and to 
“learn from others”. Thus, farmers’ social networks, their level of risk aversion, are among some of the 
factors that help explain why some farmers apply faster than others, why some need time, and why 
others never apply. Analyzing the time to request for a land certificate thus provides insights on the 
obstacles faced by different groups of farmers. Duration models while rarely used to study land 
certification processes, are often used in the literature on technology adoption (see Abdulai and 
Huffman, 2005; Carletto et al., 2010 among others).  
Second, the promotional campaigns conducted by different organizations after the first LLOs were 
created, have induced varying prices and information access, and thus certification conditions. From a 
policy point of view it is particularly interesting to find out whom have these campaigns reached and 
influenced, and to distinguish those who applied to a land certificate during campaign years from those 
who applied in non-campaign years. With this approach, we can also assess whether the campaigns 
have been inclusive or rather selective. 
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4.2. Model specification 
In what follows, we run various plot-level regressions based on duration models using the 2011 and 
2015 rounds of the PECF survey. Our aim is to analyse the factors explaining the time elapsed between 
the establishment of a LLO in a commune and the request for a certificate for a specific plot, given 
commune, household and plot characteristics.  
More precisely, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard model that writes: 
ℎ = ℎ	

 
where ℎ is the estimated hazard function,  is the time, ℎ is baseline hazard function,   are 
household and plot characteristics and  are the parameters to be estimated. The reference to 
“hazards” is used by analogy to the medical literature in which these models have been used and 
developed for studying the risks of dying or of facing a disease given patients’ characteristics.  These 
models thus allow to account for the existence of a time trend in the occurrence of an event, and of 
factors that accelerate or decelerate this occurence. The event we focus on here is the request of a 
land certificate.  
In our case, ℎ represents the time elapsed between the establishment of a LLO in household ’s 
commune, and the request for a land certificate made by the household  for his plot . The baseline 
hazard, ℎ,	is a function of time and is interpreted as the likelihood that a household applies for a 
certificate at time  when all characteristics are equal to 0 (Carletto et al., 2010). 
We rely on Cox’s semi-parametric method for estimating the model, meaning that we do not directly 
estimate ℎ	nor do we give it a specific distribution. The proportional hazard model however 
assumes that the effects estimated are constant over time. When this is not the case the estimates are 
biased and misleading (Bellera et al., 2010). The proportionality assumption must therefore be tested 
and when violated, the variability of the effects in time must be addressed. 
Following descriptive results and the literature on the determinants of certification, we include in the 
model various plot and household characteristics likely to explain the timing to certification. First of 
all, we only focus on the plots that are owned by one or several household member, as only those can 
be certified by him.  
At the household level, we expect both age and the education level of the head to influence the 
decision to certify, as they are linked to information access, to experience, and also to risk taking 
behavior. Also, age is relevant to grasp the range of land rights hold by the landowners, notably on 
inherited plots (children fully inherited only when both parents died and when sharing have been 
approved by all inheritors). The older the right holder is, the more probable he enjoys full private 
property on his plots. We also include variables measuring households’ relative wealth within their 
commune by including wealth terciles described in section 3. Since the communes in the sample are 
relatively heterogeneous in terms of wealth, but also in terms of certification prices, we use within-
commune terciles instead of the wealth index alone. Although the prices of certificates are relatively 
low compared to other forms for legal registration (through land titles), they may still constitute an 
obstacle for the poorest households (and they are more expensive than other forms of formalization 
through hand written documents). The wealth terciles, in addition to a variable measuring the price of 
certificates account for this effect. Wealth terciles capture also social ranking within the commune and 
may be correlated as well with information access and risk aversion. 
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Finally we include two variables capturing the migratory status of households. A first one indicates 
whether the household considers himself allochthon, meaning that it does not originate from the 
commune but was born in the village. A second one indicates whether the household moved in the 
commune recently or if the family is from the commune. Some migratory fluxes are indeed relatively 
old and some households, still considered as allochthones, have established in a commune for one or 
more generations. Yet they are not considered as autochthons, and following Malagasy tradition, they 
would still eventually return to be buried next to their ancestors. But their integration and rights over 
land in particular might differ from those of the autochthons, and also from those of the recent 
migrants. We believe that these two dimensions matter when studying demand for land certification.   
Plot-level variables account for the type of plot, whether a rice field, a residence field, a plain field or 
another type of cultivated land, and the plot size. We also include a variable describing the mode of 
acquisition of the parcel by the household, whether it was inherited, purchased, given or cleared by 
the household, as we expect that the demand for certification will differ according to the degree of 
uncertainty attached to different modes of acquisition and thus of the perceived risk of losing right. 
The mode of acquisition of a parcel will indeed have an incidence the bundle of rights associated to 
the land and on also the perceived insecurity, as for different modes of acquisition, the number, 
identity and diversity of possible protesters of these rights also changes. For instance, the rights over 
inherited parcels may be better recognized within communities than the rights over a parcel recently 
purchased, and therefore the incentives for reinforcing ownership rights through certification may be 
higher for the purchased parcels. 
The identity of the owner – and of the decision maker on a particular plot – whether Mister, Madam, 
both spouses or other members, is introduced in the model. We indeed expect that men and women, 
whose rights maybe be differently recognized, have different incentives for formalizing them (see for 
instance Goldstein and Udry, 2008 in Ghana). We also control for the existence and the types of other 
documents held by the owner: “petit papiers”, “quittance”, land title or none to test whether land 
certificates are perceived to be a complement to those existing documents – in such case we would 
expect a positive or non-significant coefficient – or whether certificates are demanded mostly when 
these documents are absent14. 
Finally we integrate in the model a variable measuring the price of the certificate in the communes at 
different times. For each commune, we consider two prices, as shown in Table 4: the price of the 
certificate during promotional campaigns, which is usually substantially lower than the price of the 
certificate proposed outside these campaigns. The variable is included as a time-varying covariate, 
defined for each commune, and for different periods, namely in- and off-campaign periods. This 
variable thus enables us to estimate to what extent have these campaigns influenced the certification 
demand in the communes under study. 
4.3. Estimation of the time to certification and test of the proportional hazard assumption 
Results from the Cox proportional hazard estimation are reported in Table 12. Column (1) provides the 
results of a multivariate conventional Cox regression model which relies on the proportional hazards 
                                                          
14 Note that it is usually not possible to hold for a same parcel a certificate and a land title, but as we focus here 
on the request and not on the delivery of a certificate, it is possible to observe that a household has requested a 
certificate on a parcel tha was already title. 
22 
 
(PH) assumption. As is clear from this first column, the “risk”, or likelihood of certification is increased 
for plots localized in lowlands compared to plots localized on other types of land, and for large 
compared to small plots. This result is coherent with the hypothesis that household chose to certify 
parcels with the highest economic value. It is by contrast much decreased for inherited, donated and 
cleared plots compared to purchased plots, for plots that are farmed by the owner compared to plots 
that are leased-out, and for plots for which rights are already secured by a land title, a petit papier or 
a tax receipt compared to plots for which there is no document at all. The identity of the plot’s owner 
(i.e. whether the owner of the plot is the couple or the wife compared to Mister) is found to have no 
significant effect on the likelihood of certification in this first specification. With regards household 
characteristics, neither the education level of the household head nor his age is found to have any 
impact on the risk of certification. By contrast, both wealth and migration status do have an impact, 
with the risk of certification on a given plot being increased when the household belongs to the highest 
wealth tercile compared to the lowest one, and when it is composed of people presenting themselves 
as allochthons but who were born in the village compared to autochthons. Not surprisingly, the price 
to be paid to get a land certificate is also found to have an impact of the probability of certification: 
the higher the price, the lower the risk of certification all else equal.  
We nevertheless need to assess whether the assumption of proportional hazards holds in our analysis. 
To this end, we use two types of test, a graphical one, and a parametric one. For the graphical strategy, 
we apply a transformation of the Kaplan-Meier survival curves and plot the function log(-log(S(t))) as 
the function of the log survival time, in which S(t) is the survival probability, that is the probability that 
a plot remains not certified beyond some time t in our case. We can do so because most of our 
variables are categorical variables. If the plotted lines are reasonably parallel, the PH assumption has 
not been violated. As is clear from Figure 4, several variables are found to violate the PH assumption. 
This is notably the case of the variables relating to the identity of the plot’s owner (Mister, Madam, 
couple or family), the wealth variable, and our dummies for whether the household is allochthon or 
autochthon. A single hazard ratio describing the effect of these variables is thus inappropriate. 
Graphical methods for checking the PH assumption do not, however, provide a formal diagnostic test, 
and call for other approaches.  
We adopt Cox’s approach and assess departure from non-proportionality by introducing interaction 
terms for the above-mentioned variables, that is time-dependent variables created by the product of 
our variables and time. Adding these interaction terms to the model, the hazard then becomes: 
ℎ = ℎ	

∙ 
If γ > 0 (resp. γ < 0), then the HR increases (resp. decreases) over time. Testing for non-proportionality 
of the hazards is equivalent to testing if γ is significantly different from 0. Results of this test are 
provided in column (2) of Table 12 which provides the results of a Cox model with time-by-covariate 
interactions. Overall, they confirm that the hazard ratios associated with the variables relating to the 
identity of the plot’s owner (Mister, Madam, couple or family), the wealth variable, and our dummies 
for whether the household is allochthon or autochthon are not constant over time. 
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Figure 4. Graphical tests of the proportional hazard assumption. Log-log curves.
 
 
 
With regards the wealth variables, the parameters γ associated with interacted terms are negative, 
which suggests that the hazard ratios are decreasing over time. More precisely, the estimated hazard 
ratios for the variable taking the value 1 when the household belongs to the second wealth tercile 
(wealth tercile 2) are 2.4, 1.4 and 0.8 at respectively 1, 3 and 5 years. This means that the probability f 
certification for a plot owned by someone belonging to the second wealth tercile is 2.4 times higher 
than for a plot owned by someone of the first wealth tercile (who is poorer) after 1 year. However, the 
effect of wealth fades with time: five years after the establishment of a LLO in a commune, the risk of 
certification for a plot owned by someone belonging to the second wealth tercile is decreased 
compared to a plot owned by someone belonging to the first wealth tercile. The same holds true for 
the variable taking the value 1 when the household belongs to the third wealth tercile. The estimated 
hazard ratios for this variable are 3.3, 2.1, 1.4 and 0.9 at respectively 1, 3, 5 and 7 years. This suggests 
that the land certification process becomes more inclusive as time passes. While richer households 
were more likely than poorer ones to request a land certificate in the very first years after the start of 
the reform, poorer households have been catching up afterwards. The same holds true for plot owners 
who belong to the category “’Other owners” or “allochthons migrants”: while the risk of certification 
for their plots was much decreased compared to the reference categories (namely “Mister” and 
“Autochthon” respectively) in the first three years, it has been increasing afterwards. Again, this 
suggests that those who initially remained outside of the certification process have managed to catch 
up after a while. This delayed response by some segments of land owners may be interpreted in 
different ways: first, because of the complexity in the distribution of land rights, some people may 
have had the feeling that they were not legitimate enough to request a land certificate. Second, people 
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could have been reluctant to request a land certificate because they initially feared that it would raise 
conflicts or did not trust local authorities. Last, some people could have remained outside the 
certification process because they were insufficiently informed about the reform and did not grasp the 
ins and outs of it. It thus took them a while to get informed and follow the early movers.  
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Table 12. Plot-level duration model, time to demand a land certificate. Semi-parametric Cox 
regression. 
 
Hazard ratio
Robust 
standard error Hazard ratio
Robust 
standard error
Plot characteristics
Localised in the lowland + 2.069*** (0.294) 2.058*** (0.295)
Residence plot + 1.521 (0.514) 1.554 (0.516)
Non-rice cultivated plot + 0.845 (0.281) 0.843 (0.277)
Past conflict + 0.551 (0.283) 0.557 (0.288)
Area (log) 1.217*** (0.0590) 1.218*** (0.0593)
Acquired through heritage + 0.261*** (0.0446) 0.270*** (0.0462)
Acquired through donation + 0.449*** (0.118) 0.457*** (0.118)
Acquired after clearing + 0.359*** (0.0785) 0.374*** (0.0826)
Owner is the couple + 0.889 (0.192) 1.761* (0.564)
Owner is Madam + 1.384 (0.305) 1.062 (0.405)
Other owner + 1.301 (0.761) 0.191** (0.128)
Farmed by owner + 0.727* (0.133) 0.731* (0.131)
Other document - title + 0.0286*** (0.0299) 0.0290*** (0.0302)
Other document - petit papier + 0.0326*** (0.0132) 0.0342*** (0.0135)
Other document - quittance + 0.0535*** (0.0299) 0.0537*** (0.0300)
Household characteristics
Education level 1.143 (0.111) 1.139 (0.110)
Age 1.004 (0.00597) 1.004 (0.00592)
Wealth tercile 2 + 1.383 (0.306) 3.204*** (1.271)
Wealth tercile 3 + 2.096*** (0.486) 4.169*** (1.630)
Allochthon "Native" + 2.576*** (0.815) 4.040*** (1.521)
Allochthon "Migrant" + 0.519* (0.176) 0.187*** (0.0871)
Commune dummy variables
Vakinankaratra - Ambatomena + 1.503 (0.769) 1.157 (0.599)
Vakinankaratra - Ambohimiarivo + 1.421 (0.802) 0.932 (0.541)
Vakinankaratra - Manandona  + 2.679 (1.611) 1.558 (0.903)
Diana - Antsakoamanondro + 4.719*** (2.125) 3.504*** (1.576)
Diana - Benavony + 7.041*** (3.081) 5.551*** (2.420)
Menabe - Ampanihy + 2.046 (0.947) 1.549 (0.720)
Menabe - Malimbandy + 1.455 (0.704) 1.094 (0.523)
Menabe - Analaiva + 2.601** (1.102) 2.501** (1.053)
Time varying covariate
Price of certificate (log) 0.819*** (0.0538) 0.754*** (0.0506)
Time-by-covariate interactions
Owner is the couple + 0.788** (0.0904)
Owner is Madam + 1.092 (0.108)
Other owner + 1.651*** (0.271)
Wealth tercile 2 + 0.764** (0.0834)
Wealth tercile 3 + 0.801* (0.0954)
Allochthon "Native" + 0.791 (0.157)
Allochthon "Migrant" + 1.509** (0.313)
Observations
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard-errors clustered at the household-level in parentheses
+ indicate dummy variables (yes=1, no=0)
-
-
-
-
5,389 5,389
(1) (2)
-
-
-
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5. Conclusion 
(To be completed) 
• The earlier applicants, who are also the ones who benefited from low prices seized the 
opportunity to apply for certificates in response to information and promotional campaigns in 
villages.   
• Promotional campaigns during the first years the reform strongly increased the level of 
demand reached very various profiles, but mainly the better off.  
• The households who applied for certificate several years after the start of the reform did it in 
order to fend off concrete threats. These latter were mostly poor households and women. 
•  Renewing Promotional campaign might be an option: 
–  to increase again the number of applications  
– and, as households are better informed and less risk averse,  to give new opportunities 
of formalization for poor and vulnerable households 
– And then to favor a massive and inclusive land reform  
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Appendix 
Figure A1: Number of requests for land certicates in the 9 communes covered by the PECF survey, 2008-2016) Land 0bservatory Data 
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